Pitch framing's value

[caulfield12]

http://www.baseballprospectus.com/sortable...php?cid=1819124

 

I'm currently reading the book BIG DATA BASEBALL (2013/14 Pittsburgh Pirates' resurgence) and thought I'd bring up this particular discussion.

 

 

It seems to be the only argument for keeping Tyler Flowers, and Soto to a lesser extent.

 

The main thesis of the book is the "unexploited" niche value of pitch framing, and how that enabled them to identify Russell Martin (despite his .211 average in 2012) as THE free agent catcher to acquire based on this statistic, and the fact that his offensive downturn allowed them to offer only $17 million over two years.

 

If you look at the numbers for F. Cervelli, you'll find him #2, with popular offseason acquisition targets Grandal #1 and Jason Castro #4, as well as Miguel Montero at #9 and Rene Rivera (see article http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2...ytics/25417499/ ) at #12 and much higher last year, #1.

 

Obviously, there's not a 100% correlation with winning/playoff teams, as you'll see Mike Zunino (of the Tyler Flowers School of Offense) very high on the list as well, with the Mariners. There does appear to be a positive correlation, though, between teams in the playoff hunt and this particular statistic, specifically with the Pirates and their focus on its value.

 

Some of the younger catchers on the positive side of the ledger are Hedges, Plawecki and Caleb Joseph...fwiw.

 

 

The main point is that the Pirates and Rays (with Martin, Cervelli and Rene Rivera) found veteran, "high leadership value" catchers for bargain prices.

 

The second most important point is the value of pitch framing was used in the targeting of Francisco Liriano (who ended up signing for $1 million in 2013 after the contract was voided due to an offseason broken arm, he later reached the incentives to build value back up and kick in an $8 million 2014 deal)...

 

That the MAIN reason Liriano was poised for a comeback were that his peripheral pitching numbers were much better than his traditional stats, and that his "stuff" had returned by late 2012 (pitch fx, etc.), almost to the level of 2006 (just a couple of ticks off with fb and slider).

 

The book points out how poor Ryan Doumit, Butera and Mauer (Twins) along with AJ Pierzynski (2012) were at pitch framing as support for the pairing of Liriano with R.Martin and now Cervelli.

 

Finally, you can also see the value of this pitch framing with Edinson Volquez's career comeback (with the Pirates), which he's now carried over to the Royals.

 

 

 

 

And all this is not to argue that Tyler Flowers should be the starter in 2016, it's just one way to view or "frame" the discussion...so to speak...and perhaps further evidence the Sox front office is starting to pay attention to these advanced statistical metrics.

 

(Unfortunately, it's too late to "rescue" 2012, though.)

 

The scary part is how EARLY the Pirates started to look at advanced statistics and build their own huge database...it began well over a decade ago, and was adopted first on the minor league level, where all their affiliates FORCED their 2B and SS to shift closer to 1B and 3B as an organizational philosophy...in the beginning, they even had plastic spikes in the ground to mark the positions and remind their players.

 

It wasn't until 2013 (with Hurdle's job on the line) that they got together with the advanced metrics people and GM and started meeting weekly in the off season and daily in season to look at the whole shifting trend and how best to implement it at the big league level to maximum effect.

 

Can Robin Ventura adjust with the time, like Clint Hurdle did? Time will tell, but it's the MAIN reason they (the Pirates) were able to take an average or below-average defensive team and make it a great one in one offseason without changing much of the talent on the roster (especially on their INF corners).

 

 

Edited June 29, 2015 by caulfield12