Here is MLBTR’s inaugural list of the top 20 GM candidates in MLB:

 

1.Jerry Dipoto, Senior VP, Scouting & Player Development, Diamondbacks (former pitcher)

2.Rick Hahn, VP, AGM, White Sox

3.Thad Levine, AGM, Rangers

4.Ben Cherington, Senior VP, AGM, Red Sox (now GM)

5.David Forst, AGM, Athletics

6.Tony LaCava, VP Baseball Operations and AGM, Blue Jays

7.Mike Chernoff, AGM, Indians

8.Bryan Minniti, AGM, Nationals

9.A.J. Preller, Senior Director, Player Personnel, Rangers

10.Kim Ng, MLB (former White Sox, Dodgers exec, only female and Asian-American)

11.DeJon Watson, AGM, Player Development, Dodgers

12.Al Avila, VP, AGM, Tigers (Alex's dad)

13.Damon Oppenheimer, Scouting Director, Yankees

14.Mike Radcliff, Vice President of Player Personnel, Twins (best of the Twins' organization after Ryan, should have been named GM over Smith four years ago)

15.Bill Geivett, Sr. VP Scouting & Player Development, AGM, Rockies

16.John Ricco, VP, AGM, Mets

17.Jeff Kingston, AGM, Mariners

18.Logan White, AGM, Amateur & International Scouting, Dodgers

19.Peter Woodfork, MLB

20.Matt Klentak, Director of Baseball Operations, Orioles

 

Honorable mentions in alphabetical order: Matt Arnold, Director, Pro Scouting (Rays), Jeff Bridich, Senior Director of Baseball Operations (Rockies), John Coppolella, Director of Baseball Administration (Braves), Dan Jennings, VP Player Personnel & AGM (Marlins), Jason McLeod, VP, AGM (Padres), J.J. Picollo, AGM, Scouting & Player Development (Royals), Shiraz Rehman, Director of Player Personnel (Diamondbacks) and Josh Stein, Director of Baseball Operations (Padres).

 

 

 

 

 

http://www.wetfeet.com/advice-tools/intern...-do-next-summer

Saw a lot of similarities (Colombia business school grad) with Shiraz Rehman (I'm assuming he's the only executive with an Arab-American background on the list) and Rick Hahn in terms of their backgrounds and roles with their respective teams.

 

 

Thought this was very interesting, in light of the conversations that have been so prevalent throughout the offseason.

http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=8619

 

David Laurila: What is your role with the Diamondbacks?

 

Shiraz Rehman: Technically, I'm the Director of Baseball Operations, so I guess that means a lot of work on arbitration, contracts and contract structuring, and some of the negotiations. I do some statistical and financial analysis to help support team decision-making on acquiring players-trading for players, signing new players, etcetera. I kind of oversee our research efforts, and the development of our technological tools that we use across our department. I handle our entry-level hiring. And then, most of my responsibilities on a day-to-day basis revolve around the major league team. That would be major league transactions, waivers and rules compliance, 40-man roster management, etcetera. I work with the major league staff and players to get those kinds of things executed.

 

 

DL: How would you describe the role analytics play in the organization?

 

SR: I'd say it's rather large. Rather than having this particular discreet department that does analytics for us, which operates in a silo, I think that our goal is that everyone in the front office possesses the ability to sort of blend both the subjective and the objective in their decision-making. We do have certain folks that play more of a role in objective statistical analysis than others, but I'd argue that "analytics" is a term that can apply to any level of information gathering that we undertake, be it scouting, player development, payroll, or specific areas that focus around the major league team and/or game-planning.

 

DL: There is a difference between looking at numbers and looking at the right numbers. How much time goes into parsing out which is which?

 

SR: A tremendous amount, and that's a very good point, because it's typically garbage in and garbage out. I think that in a lot of the research we see, whether it is from the internet, or from ideas that are e-mailed to me, or some of the work that we do, we're careful to evaluate what the data is that we're looking at, rather than just jumping to a conclusion because we see a result and assume that it's 100 percent correct. We're charged with-let's put it this way: Armed with data, intellects do a great job of objectively coming to a conclusion about what happened, which can be particularly useful. What is often our job is to figure out how something happened, and I think that being particular about what numbers, and data, you're using helps you to refine your conclusion in that context.

 

DL: What is your approach to studying predictive data?

 

SR: It obviously depends on the particular task that we're trying to solve. I think that some of the predictive data, in terms of projections, that is out there and available in the marketplace, is pretty good. We kind of use that a fair amount. We're always looking to establish predictive relationships between statistics or trends. I think that's something that is pretty important to us, it just often becomes difficult to tease out which variables end up impacting a particular issue larger than others. Usually it's a pretty multi-varied process that is pretty complex. As with most things, it incorporates both subjective and objective measures.

 

DL: In today's panel discussion, you said that leadership is 98 percent subjective. When you look at certain veteran players around the game, isn't it rather clear that they possess a strong leadership component?

 

SR: I think it's important to draw a distinction between classifying something as subjective, and suggesting it does not exist, because there's no question that certain players provide leadership and help bring out the best in those around them over a long season. I'm not sure about an exact percentage, but the question posed in the discussion was specifically surrounding how you would measure it. I'm not really sure that it is possible, but it is probably one of the areas where we're looking to make more strides as far as analytics. How can we quantify that leadership or team-chemistry quotient? Can we measure it based on the impact, or marginal difference, in other teammates' production when that player is around, on the field or in the game? That's one way we try to do it, but it's a bit of uncharted territory, and as a result provides a good example of decisions we make that rely a little more on our subjective observations. By no means can everything about a player be expressed as a number, and as an industry we must be careful not to exclude a variable from any type of analysis simply because it's the toughest to quantify on paper.

 

DL: Do you feel that a player's impact on his teammates can be quantified?

 

SR: I think it can be, but I haven't seen a definitive, comprehensive way to do it yet. Something that we do a fair amount of trying to understand, even when we were assessing Jon Garland this year, is what that relative impact is. As an example, there's the value of what Jon Garland can bring as a starting pitcher, as a stand-alone asset with what he brings to the table for our team. Secondarily, what is the value of adding those innings into the 14 hundred-plus innings that we'll need over the course of a year, and how does that make our bullpen better, by us arguably having to rely less on them? We look at things like that.

 

DL: Another thing you mentioned in the panel discussion was aptitude versus athletic aptitude.

 

SR: I was actually just talking about that with Helen [Zelman; Diamondback's baseball operations assistant] and one of our scouts. In terms of looking at and projecting amateur players, [we often] look at their athleticism, we look at their performance and physical tools, trying to assess whether or not they'll be good professional players. And one of the harder parts is assessing what kind of aptitude they have to learn as they progress up the professional baseball chain. People automatically gravitate to things like, 'What is their GPA at Georgia Tech?' or 'Where did they go to high school and were they on the honor roll?' But sometimes the difference between athletic aptitude, the ability to take something you watch happen, or something the coach asks you to do, and immediately do it, might be different than if you can solve an equation for X.

 

DL: Do you feel there is such a thing as a "closer mentality"?

 

SR: I think it definitely exists. Some players are simply more armed with the tools and approach that is required to pitch in more leveraged situations. The question that exists in my mind the most would be, "Can it be learned?" Some people would submit to you that it is sort of a binary either-you-have-it-or-you-don't thing. I think it definitely exists, but I wonder if it can be learned, or acquired, over time.

 

 

DL: Justin Masterson, in Boston, is a good example of a young pitcher whose ultimate role has not been decided. Where do you stand on the relative-value-of-a-starter-versus-a-late-innings-reliever question?

 

SR: I think you make every effort you can to keep a guy who has a chance to be a starter, a starter. As he ascends the development track from A-ball to Double-A to Triple-A to the big leagues, a lot of those answers tend to sort themselves out. I, personally, would always rather have a major league starter than a major league bullpen arm. I think when you get to a Papelbon question, where it's a dominant closer versus a starter, that's a little tougher. But given Masterson's repertoire, with him being a heavy-sinker type guy, he has the possibility to be sort of an innings-eater, ground-ball machine as a starter-to the extent he has enough secondary pitches to get through a lineup two or three times. To me, that has more value than working out of the pen.

 

 

DL: In looking at the construct of a team, just how important is defense to the Diamondbacks' organization?

 

SR: I think it means a lot. It is one of the frontiers where, when people talk about inefficiencies in the marketplace, it is arguably something that doesn't get priced as well as it could. Whether it is Josh [byrnes'] acquisition of Orlando Hudson three years ago, and the value we got out of that trade, or in understanding the value we receive out of Chris Snyder above and beyond his OPS. Maybe there is an opportunity to acquire guys who are defensively gifted players that the market doesn't value as much as they should.

 

DL: Going by The Fielding Bible rankings, the Diamondbacks were a little below average in team defense last season. How meaningful is that to you?

 

SR: I think that defensive metrics, on the aggregate, have improved significantly in recent times, thanks to the work of John Dewan, Bill James, and others. But in fairness, they are probably still imperfect, and as a result we still rely a fair bit on some of our internal assessments and subjective valuations in that area to come up with a comprehensive look at defense. In that respect, over the last couple of seasons we have been fairly consistently above average in the outfield, and slightly below average around the infield. Ultimately our team defense is of great significance to us, as we take our ability to suppress run-scoring above and beyond the contributions of our pitching staff quite seriously. Both as a young club with some above-average athletes on the field, and in the context of our position in the marketplace, we feel like defense and baserunning are areas that we should excel at, and believe we can do so.

 

DL: Moving over to offense, how concerned are you with the number of strikeouts your third baseman accumulated last season?

 

SR: Well, I don't think Mark [Reynolds] was happy, and I don't think anyone wants to lead the league in strikeouts. Putting the ball in play, especially in two-strike counts, is something that is important on a team basis for us, whether it is Mark, Chris Young, Justin Upton, or any of our players. Still, with a guy like that, sometimes you need to evaluate the damage that he does do with his ability to hit the ball out of the ballpark, which is something we don't necessarily do all that much on an individual basis. But we do look at one through eight in our lineup, and our aggregate power production, and feel pretty good about it. It is a concern for me, but if Mark continues to generate the kind of extra-base power that he does, and can be an average defender at third base on the low end, we're probably willing to live with a guy who strikes out a little bit in the context of our entire club.

 

DL: Looking at player acquisition and in-game strategy on both sides of the ball, how does Chase Field impact the Arizona Diamondbacks?

 

SR: Clearly, Chase Field plays as a rather hitter-friendly atmosphere, arguably one of the most so in Major League Baseball. As a result, we certainly consider that in the context of players we look to acquire-fly-ball/ground-ball rates for pitchers, an ability to keep it in the park. Offensively we look to construct a team that can take advantage of not only a generic offensive advantage, but particularly the large gaps and opportunities for extra bases that exist in our outfield.

 

DL: Looking at your projected starting lineup for 2009, seven of the eight position players are between the ages of 25 and 29. What does that tell us?

 

SR: Probably most importantly, we're fortunate to be in that position, and we feel that is very much an intended outcome of what we are trying to accomplish. But it tells you a few things. One is that the large majority of our position players are still in the up-swing portions of their careers, and as a result we are likely to not be surprised if their actual performance differs rather significantly from their projections at this stage. Second, it is indicative of our attempts at stability in terms of roster construction. Our goal is to put together a group of talented young players at the earlier stages of their careers, and to keep them together throughout at least their years of control with the club. Our belief is that these players are able to grow, assimilate, and improve together, and more importantly are able to contend for a championship every year on a consistent basis, rather than sporadic one-year windows out of every three or four. At our relative payroll level we probably are never going to be huge players in the free-agent market, but we can be selective based on individual needs, [such as] Byrnes, Garland, Lopez, and Gordon. We inherited a talented farm system, but have developed and promoted them aggressively and relatively successfully. On a go-forward basis, drafting and developing to continue to feed the major league roster with a constant influx of young talent is an important focus for us as a group, and the 2009 draft should present us with a good opportunity to add to our inventory.

He will be the GM by 2015.

He will be the GM by 2015.

 

Do you think he would be willing to wait that long? As the second best candidate out there he should have better options out there before 2015

I would imagine his salary is right up there and even ahead of some of the GM's of the bottom 5-7 teams in the majors...that JR has basically promised him an opportunity and that KW will have from 1-3 years to fix things.

 

On the other hand, with how poorly everything's turned out for KW the last 3 seasons, you have to think the luck will start turning his way and that the White Sox will somehow be competitive again by Year 2 or Year 3, in which case he (Hahn) would still be stuck waiting in line for the GM job...or passed over for LaRussa, potentially.

 

The grass is always greener on the other side, though.

 

 

He will be the GM by 2015.

 

I hope sooner than that.

Do you think he would be willing to wait that long? As the second best candidate out there he should have better options out there before 2015

I do think he will wait that long. He sees how loyal JR is and the resources the Sox have. He has pull out/turned down other opportunities in the past. He is biding his time because he knows KW's tenure as GM is about over.

He's been number two on that list for like 5 years now.

I do think he will wait that long. He sees how loyal JR is and the resources the Sox have. He has pull out/turned down other opportunities in the past. He is biding his time because he knows KW's tenure as GM is about over.

 

I've sort of wondered if Kenny is just being kept on to merely clean up his own mess. To allow Hahn have a decent position to start out with. Let Hahn eventually take over with a clean slate after Peavy/Rios/Dunn are gone, and hopefully he'll have a semblance of a farm system to play around with at that point too. If so, one would hope he's had great say in the current moves being made to "rebuild."

I've sort of wondered if Kenny is just being kept on to merely clean up his own mess. To allow Hahn have a decent position to start out with. Let Hahn eventually take over with a clean slate after Peavy/Rios/Dunn are gone, and hopefully he'll have a semblance of a farm system to play around with at that point too. If so, one would hope he's had great say in the current moves being made to "rebuild."

It will be interesting to see his philosophy. KW is as as different as you can get from Schueler who held onto all of his prospects of which most don't turn out. I have a feeling Hahn will be more like KW and trade for established veterans and use the farm system more as trading currency than prospects for the Sox.

It will be interesting to see his philosophy. KW is as as different as you can get from Schueler who held onto all of his prospects of which most don't turn out. I have a feeling Hahn will be more like KW and trade for established veterans and use the farm system more as trading currency than prospects for the Sox.

 

A little more conservative and risk-averse, I could see their farm system ranking in 12-18 range instead of the bottom 2 or 3 organizations.

 

Of course, a lot of that's going to be determined by how well the team finishes in 2012 and 2013, in terms of slotting and draft position for the first round picks. If we are in the 70's (especially lower 70's) for wins the next two seasons, then it's pretty hard to imagine not improving that farm system...and bringing in Soler or Cespedes would also have a huge impact, obviously.

 

Where KW is 90% MLB results and 10% farm system development, nurturing, I think we'll see more of a 70/30 split in favor of the results at the major league level and balancing payroll/profitability with long-term sustainability.

 

The flaw in the KW model has always been consistency and year to year fluctuations caused by his changing the chemistry and make-up of the roster around so much...and not having a wave of "Sox bred" players being promoted year after year from within, players who have learned to play the game the right way as opposed to learning 90% of it at the major league level, when results always have to be prioritized over teaching/development.

 

 

A little more conservative and risk-averse, I could see their farm system ranking in 12-18 range instead of the bottom 2 or 3 organizations.

 

Of course, a lot of that's going to be determined by how well the team finishes in 2012 and 2013, in terms of slotting and draft position for the first round picks. If we are in the 70's (especially lower 70's) for wins the next two seasons, then it's pretty hard to imagine not improving that farm system...and bringing in Soler or Cespedes would also have a huge impact, obviously.

 

Where KW is 90% MLB results and 10% farm system development, nurturing, I think we'll see more of a 70/30 split in favor of the results at the major league level and balancing payroll/profitability with long-term sustainability.

 

The flaw in the KW model has always been consistency and year to year fluctuations caused by his changing the chemistry and make-up of the roster around so much...and not having a wave of "Sox bred" players being promoted year after year from within, players who have learned to play the game the right way as opposed to learning 90% of it at the major league level, when results always have to be prioritized over teaching/development.

I agree with everything you said but I don't it's a flaw in the KW model as much as it's his philosophy from his point of view. Most prospects don't turn out successfully so if you can package them for someone who has had success, you have a better chance of being good. This is the way KW looks at things. Both philosophies have advantages and disadvantages.

 

I'm not sure there is a "right way to play" the game other than busting your rear all the time. There are many philosphies on the right way.

I agree with everything you said but I don't it's a flaw in the KW model as much as it's his philosophy from his point of view. Most prospects don't turn out successfully so if you can package them for someone who has had success, you have a better chance of being good. This is the way KW looks at things. Both philosophies have advantages and disadvantages.

 

I'm not sure there is a "right way to play" the game other than busting your rear all the time. There are many philosphies on the right way.

 

SR: I was actually just talking about that with Helen [Zelman; Diamondback's baseball operations assistant] and one of our scouts. In terms of looking at and projecting amateur players, [we often] look at their athleticism, we look at their performance and physical tools, trying to assess whether or not they'll be good professional players. And one of the harder parts is assessing what kind of aptitude they have to learn as they progress up the professional baseball chain. People automatically gravitate to things like, 'What is their GPA at Georgia Tech?' or 'Where did they go to high school and were they on the honor roll?' But sometimes the difference between athletic aptitude, the ability to take something you watch happen, or something the coach asks you to do, and immediately do it, might be different than if you can solve an equation for X.

 

I think this is one of the more interesting quotes in the article....and it really goes to the failures the White Sox have endured with Josh Fields, Borchard, Brian Anderson and all the uncertainty about Beckham's future as well.

 

Then there's that leadership element....the "this player makes the players surrounding him XXX times better just by his presence in the line-up and clubhouse" factor that's so hard to measure accurately.

 

For example, how much will the White Sox miss Mark Buehrle because of that "value-added" element to his game that Greg likes to point out? How much will we suffer when AJ is no longer the full-time catcher? How much did Everett and Rowand provide the team in terms of leadership in 2005? How much did losing Juan Uribe or Joe Crede have to do with our "failures" in 2009-10-11? On the negative side, how much does Rios hurt the team chemistry, above and beyond his actual performance...or even with a manager who was obviously not fully engaged and loyal?

Edited February 7, 201214 yr by caulfield12

I agree with everything you said but I don't it's a flaw in the KW model as much as it's his philosophy from his point of view. Most prospects don't turn out successfully so if you can package them for someone who has had success, you have a better chance of being good. This is the way KW looks at things. Both philosophies have advantages and disadvantages.

 

I'm not sure there is a "right way to play" the game other than busting your rear all the time. There are many philosphies on the right way.

 

 

 

http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/news?slug=ti-femalegm070308

 

Also thought this article on Kim Ng (even though written 3 1/2 years ago) is quite insightful.

SR: I was actually just talking about that with Helen [Zelman; Diamondback's baseball operations assistant] and one of our scouts. In terms of looking at and projecting amateur players, [we often] look at their athleticism, we look at their performance and physical tools, trying to assess whether or not they'll be good professional players. And one of the harder parts is assessing what kind of aptitude they have to learn as they progress up the professional baseball chain. People automatically gravitate to things like, 'What is their GPA at Georgia Tech?' or 'Where did they go to high school and were they on the honor roll?' But sometimes the difference between athletic aptitude, the ability to take something you watch happen, or something the coach asks you to do, and immediately do it, might be different than if you can solve an equation for X.

 

I think this is one of the more interesting quotes in the article....and it really goes to the failures the White Sox have endured with Josh Fields, Borchard, Brian Anderson and all the uncertainty about Beckham's future as well.

 

Then there's that leadership element....the "this player makes the players surrounding him XXX times better just by his presence in the line-up and clubhouse" factor that's so hard to measure accurately.

 

For example, how much will the White Sox miss Mark Buehrle because of that "value-added" element to his game that Greg likes to point out? How much will we suffer when AJ is no longer the full-time catcher? How much did Everett and Rowand provide the team in terms of leadership in 2005? How much did losing Juan Uribe or Joe Crede have to do with our "failures" in 2009-10-11? On the negative side, how much does Rios hurt the team chemistry, above and beyond his actual performance...or even with a manager who was obviously not fully engaged and loyal?

Again, I agree with all of this but it doesn't really discount what the Sox have or have not done. Joe Borchard was known as an extremely intelligent person. He was always classified as a "thinking quarterback." That's saying something especially at Stanford. Brian Anderson was a carefree guy but not a bad guy. Josh Fields was known for his leadership in the huddle for big games in college football.

I know no one will miss AJ in the locker room He does work hard and knows how to call a game, so the Sox may miss that.

I'm the first one to bring up the intangibles and things you can't measure by numbers in baseball. I'm just not convinned that the Sox aren't doing it. I think KW really looks at the character of a player before he signs/trades for them. Remeber when he signed AJ when it looked like no one else would. He said he spent a long time talking to people within various organizations he player for to determine if he should sign them. I don't think grooming someone in your organization necessarily helps this. It all factors in. The manager especially in this case. I think Ozzie is a very good manager and will be successful. However, it was obviously time to go. I think the players knowing he wanted out played a large factor into the poor performance last season.

The better question is how much do we blame our....

 

1) college/high school amateur draft scouts

2) minor league development people (Bell now)

3) major league coaching staff, especially Ozzie and Walker

4) front office, KW and Hahn specifically

 

You can say "the buck stops here" and it's ultimately KW's responsibility, with scouts merely providing advice and counsel, guidance and their combined years of collective wisdom (I think Moneyball suggesting it's 150 years is a bit much, don't remember Abner Doubleday or Alexander Cartwright doing much scouting during the Civil War)...

The better question is how much do we blame our....

 

1) college/high school amateur draft scouts

2) minor league development people (Bell now)

3) major league coaching staff, especially Ozzie and Walker

4) front office, KW and Hahn specifically

 

You can say "the buck stops here" and it's ultimately KW's responsibility, with scouts merely providing advice and counsel, guidance and their combined years of collective wisdom (I think Moneyball suggesting it's 150 years is a bit much, don't remember Abner Doubleday or Alexander Cartwright doing much scouting during the Civil War)...

I think it also has to do with overall philosophy. Until a few years ago the Sox were drafting the Low ceiling but supposedly safer players such as Broadway and McCullough in the first round. I think they figured out that even these players have a high fail rate so they should change their philosophy and go for the raw but possible superstar talents like they have in the last few drafts with Sale, Mitchell, Wlaker and Thompson. All had big question marks but big talent.

 

My personal opinion is that KW is very smart and knew he didn't know drafting. He knew development which was his role in the organization before he became GM. So he relied heavily on people that were here before him such as Shaeffer and Wilder. He probably gave them to much power as the conservative style of drafting really doesn't fit with KW's "go for it" attitude with everything else. I think is why he is still around. JR is allowing the drafts from the last few years to mature (for lack of a better word) and see if KW can do it his way.

Edited February 7, 201214 yr by ptatc

I do think he will wait that long. He sees how loyal JR is and the resources the Sox have. He has pull out/turned down other opportunities in the past. He is biding his time because he knows KW's tenure as GM is about over.

 

I think if the Cubs had offered him, he would have gone. Other than that, there aren't too many others out there he'd jump to evidently.

http://blog.chron.com/ultimateastros/2012/...rojection-game/

 

Thought this was an interesting read related to the new reliance of SABR/quant/quant analysis going on the game today.

Couple of things that are interesting...that he tried to hire Keith Law as a scout this past offseason, and wasn't Jon Daniels of the Rangers also from a "non-traditional" baseball background?

 

Daniels was born and raised in Queens, New York.[2][3] He went to Hunter College High School and Cornell University, majored in Applied Economics and Management, and joined the Delta Chi Fraternity.[4][5] After graduating from Cornell University in 1999, Daniels went into business development for Allied Domecq.[6]

 

 

 

 

 

KISSIMMEE, Fla. -- For a guy who came to baseball relatiavely late in life and who runs a team that is by all accounts overmatched, new Astros GM Jeff Luhnow seems quite relaxed. He appears to have the right outlook and demeanor for a team that may again lose 100 games. "Of course, he is (calm),'' one skeptic from a rival team said. "There is absolutely no pressure.''

 

Luhnow, an intellectual ensconsed in the stat crowd (he just got back from the MIT Sports Sloan Analytics Conference), is always going to have his critics. He and Rays GM Andrew Friedman are the only ones to take the non-traditional route to the GM's chair, meaning they didn't start out as baseball executives. But Friedman quickly proved himself one of the best execs in baseball by now after starting out in the investment business.

 

Pressure or not to win this year, folks are looking to Luhnow to prove himself. Not everyone is going to be rooting for him, either. Some folks like tradition, and he's taken an unususal route to get where he is. He has a dual engineering and business degree from the University of Pennsylvania and an MBA from Northwestern University, and he got into baseball in his mid-30s with the Cardinals, in 2003.

 

Now 45, he spent nearly a decade as an executive with the Cardinals, contributing to two World Series teams as a high-level front-office person. Though, with the ongoing old-school vs. new-school denate raging (he is firmly in the latter crowd), there were definitely some critics in St. Louis. He tried to hire ESPN's Keith Law for a top scouting job in Houston, which wouldn't necessarily have endeared him to some older scouts. (Law turned the job down.)

 

Say this for Luhnow, the Cardinals generally thrived in his time in a top scouting and player development job there. And say this, too, he seems to have an excellent handle on where the Astros are today. Luhnow said he seeks progress, which is precisely the right answer for a team that lost 106 games last year and threatens to repeat that output. He also said their seemingly dire situation will be aided by a lucrative TV contract that begins next year and that they also hope to become a free-agent player if they can recapture their audience in what he pointed out was a big market.

 

Luhnow provided a positive-as-he-could be rundown of the Astros playing personnel, but it isn't fair to recount any of that here because his job is to be as upbeat as possible, no matter what the roster looks like. While Luhnow mentioned several nice things about many of their players, he isn't about to pretend the team is ready to contend, which shows he's far from delusional. He does seem to have high hopes for new Astros shortstop Jed Lowrie, whom he acquired in a trade for ex-Astros closer Mark Melancon, as well as a few others.

 

The reality, though, is that even his relatively honest portrayal of his team's situation doesn't say how bad the Astros are thought to be. Their rotation led by Wandy Rodriguez, Bud Norris and J.A. Happ is somewhat presentable, but their everyday lineup threatens to be the worst in baseball. Everyone has their own evaluation of course, but one scout said he believed that besides veteran Carlos Lee, who Houston would love to trade, only two players have a chance to be major-league average, catcher Jason Castro and third baseman Chris Johnson, and Castro missed last year with a knee injury and Johnson hit .251 with seven home runs. "Two years ago, he hit,'' the scout said. "Last year he forgot how.''(sounds like Gordon Beckham, Alex Rios and Adam Dunn)

 

Jon Heyman

Edited March 5, 201214 yr by caulfield12