StrangeSox

QUOTE (Jenksismyb**** @ Mar 14, 2011 -> 04:39 PM) It's a tax that hasn't been an issue until now, when the state is seeking any and all available sources of money. Yeah, until the world economy crashed, it wasn't as big of a concern that the existence of e-commerce allowed out-of-state companies to gain a competitive advantage by not having to collect sales taxes and by virtue of the fact that no one reports them or probably even know that they're supposed to. But now it is an issue and Illinois is looking to close pretty blatant tax evasion problems.

QUOTE (Jenksismyb**** @ Mar 14, 2011 -> 04:30 PM) I don't think we're all that far ahead frankly, and we have a higher cost of living too. No, we are pretty f***ing far ahead of those states.

QUOTE (Jenksismyb**** @ Mar 14, 2011 -> 04:30 PM) Does Amazon have any responsibility to those affiliates? Is that what you're arguing? Is this Obama's "the rich have the responsibility to help everyone else" line? I don't fault Amazon for making a business decision. I fault the state of Illinois for making a poor decision to try and cover past poor decisions. Illinois made a poor decision by inventing the internet and having pretty much everyone avoid paying the appropriate sales taxes?

Illinois should gut corporate taxes, gut environmental legislation, gut workplace safety rules and union rights and keep cutting public services (especially education!). Before long, we'll be right there, competing with the likes of Mississippi and Arkansas for the best businesses in the country!

Race to the bottom!

The machines were tested and advertised by the manufacturer as safe. Then they built and shipped shoddy units.

QUOTE (Jenksismyb**** @ Mar 14, 2011 -> 02:48 PM) I'd argue the not-for-profit model of not spending more than you have is one to follow. It's still two completely different institutions. The government exists to serve all citizens. It is not analogous to a business and it should not be run like one.

Or federal law, which would of course be seen as trampling on states' rights! How does this bill not do anything? You'll have to pay sales tax in Illinois now, right?

QUOTE (Jenksismyb**** @ Mar 14, 2011 -> 01:15 PM) Is that really a bad thing? Yes. Government and private enterprise are different structures serving vastly different goals. Even a not-for-profit makes a poor comparison to government.

Hey guys thanks for pointing out why this bill was seen as necessary!

I don't really have objections to much of what you've said there Balta. Except inspection cutbacks. NRC inspections are orders of magnitude more than pre-9/11 standards.

An article pointing out some of the differences between Japan's current situation and Chernobyl before Greenpeace runs with i http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News...key-differences

Please stop with that terrible nickname. "Business as Ra-zool" doesn't even make sense.

QUOTE (Balta1701 @ Mar 13, 2011 -> 01:00 PM) All 3 play into it...plus a couple of different points. Notably; the competence level of the Federal government response, which I'd say is somewhat questionable after this country's last disaster, and secondly, the relationship between the geology and the actual infrastructure, which Japan has thought a lot more about than we have. (although, I may have to exempt nuclear plants from that point) FWIW the latest I read said the diesel generators ran for a short time after the quake as expected but were damaged in the ensuing tsunami. Something to consider for coastal US plants, but not something that Braidwood (closest plant to Chicago) would have to worry about. Not sure how safety design for something like a tornado comes in.

Worse simply because of building codes, the existence of a lot of older masonry-style construction and the general lack of preparedness and awareness of Americans when compared to the Japanese?

For some reason Appendix 6, which details the methodology for MIT's study indicating 3-4 core damage incidents isn't included in the online version, so I can't really see what their "current technology" assumptions are. Thought of something else today--what's the sample size of the MIT group's data for core damage frequency? One incident, and the report is 8 years old now. So the frequency will have gone down significantly with 8 years of safe operation for something like 100 reactors around the country.

LOL, Reagan: "[...]where unions and collective bargaining are forbidden, freedom is lost."

Ok, I'm going to focus on the security aspects of the UCS report since that's what I know best. I've found that section to be less than convincing for several reasons. Their introduction to that section is all over the place. They start out by rightly placing the emphasis on "well-trained terrorists" physically entering the plant to sabotage equipment and induce a meltdown. They give some doom-and-gloom about what would happen at Indian Point based on a study by one of the co-authors but neglect to point out that the 44k was the absolute worst possible condition and that the original report contains much lower numbers. The report also simply assumed a large release of radiation but provided no mechanism and, of course, used the scare-headline complete with reference to Chernobyl. So, right off the bat, warning signs of "bias!" are flashing out at me. In one of the concluding paragraphs, they abruptly switch from a group of well-trained terrorists physically entering the plant to a 9/11-style attack without explanation. The concluding introductory paragraph is simply wrong for reasons I will point out later. The next section is, like the previous paragraph, simply not true. Plant physical security and now cyber security are both tightly and increasingly regulated and routinely tested and inspected. Nuclear facility security is the most heavily regulated security in the world. Plants around the country are spending millions of dollars to significantly upgrade their security plans. Some are more pro-active than others, going above and beyond the minimum requirements. The idea that the NRC doesn't require emergency plants for sabotage attacks is misleading--the goal of a sabotage is to cause a plant failure, for which there are emergency plans. You have a plan for loss of coolant, and it doesn't matter if that's because the pumps just broke or they were blown up. The spent fuel storage is subject to the same security requirements of the rest of the plant. If they can adequately protect the reactor building or other essential equipment, they can protect the spent fuel storage. Dry cask storage security regulations have also been increased recently beyond what this report recommended. For the next section regarding the DBT and FOF exercises, I'll simply point to the authors' own words: the DBT is withheld from public disclosure. They do not what it is or how it is compiled or how security drills and inspections are run. On that point alone, they have no basis to question it. Furthermore, what is their expertise that enables them to assess the effectiveness of the DBT? Do they have a background in special forces operations, counter-terrorism or other intelligence operations? Also, Wackenhut does not supply security for "nearly half," unless 1/4 is "nearly half." Aside from a vague reference to one particular incident, they have not shown the conflict-of-interest to be credible. I'll quote part of the summary of the GAO report they keep harping on and appear to distort: The GAO reports that the process gave the appearance that changes were made at the request of industry, not a finding of fact. And given the nature of what was being studied, the full report is withheld from public disclosure. So again, this group is cherry-picking information from an incomplete report about situations they do not have knowledge of and have no background expertise in. Now, that said, they do raise some legitimate concerns in both the security section and throughout the rest of the document. I think it's important to have well-informed, knowledgeable (read: not Greenpeace) challenges to the NRC and the industry. But, given the inaccuracies in the report and that it's significantly dated with respect to regulation changes since 2006-2007, I think it falls short.

FWIW the safety culture at some plants is ridiculous. We get "safety briefings" when we have conference calls with them. I'll read through that report you provided more closely later, but right off the bat I can say that security regulations have been stepped up substantially since 2007 (and it's 1000% different than pre-9/11). Plants undergo pretty stringent security drills and the NRC comes down hard on them if there's any deficiencies. In the section on security, they flip back and forth. On one hand they lament that the DBT doesn't cover aircraft strikes, but then also assert that the federal government should be responsible to protect from that. And, really, how could a plant security force be expected to stop or prevent an airstrike or a 9/11-style attack? It's an unreasonable criticism of the NRC's basis for the DBT. Security regulations have only gotten tighter since 2007 as well, and sites now need better protection for their dry spent fuel storage. It's not perfect. Some parts of the DBT are a little unrealistic in favor of the plants, but the NRC also has final say over any claim or interpretation and doesn't even have to prove they are physically capable of some methods of sabotage or infiltration.

QUOTE (lostfan @ Mar 12, 2011 -> 04:41 PM) SS you work in DoE? Nope. We do work for DoE and the utilities though.

Balta, as someone who works in the industry, I can say that it's the exact opposite of what you're claiming there wrt to regulations. NRC regulations have gotten increasingly strict in just about all areas of plant operation over the last decade or so, and the approval process for uprating power or extending plant licenses isn't easy, cheap or taking shortcuts. Absolutely no one wants to be left holding the "you didn't do enough" ball in the event of a nuclear disaster. Plants are spending millions every year to replace or upgrade existing equipment to meet increasingly tighter standards. Sites have resident NRC inspectors who work at that specific site full-time. Inspections have increased in frequency over time, not decreased. Aging plant equipment is a problem--that's why you see the tritium leaks at Clinton and Vermont Yankee. As for evaluation of plant equipment, any new piece of equipment that gets installed on a plant is structurally evaluated for a wide variety of load factors that include seismic conditions. Just replacing a junction box requires a ridiculous mount of planning and a 4" think binder. I think, given what's happened in Japan, the NRC and the industry need to take a look at their emergency plant operation plans to check their assumptions and see how to prevent a similar loss-of-power situation. But it's not like the NRC is just turning a blind eye to egregious violations. I'd still like to see your statistics showing that we're "overdue" for a catastrophic meltdown worse than TMI (where maybe one person died of cancer decades later). Oh, and anything from Greenpeace about nuclear power I immediately ignore because they still hype s*** like "the American Chernobyl?!?!?!"

Eh it's just the typical "we should praise business owners for blessing us with jobs like mana from heaven," as if the owners aren't profiting tremendously off of your labor.

I guess that's the thing. The owners opted out of the current agreement, not the players. They're crying poor, but they've been shown to be nothing but dishonest. I don't see why the players really have any reason to compromise, especially after the recent TV contract ruling.

Lost in the Wisconsin mess are the terrible bills being passed by Republicans in Michigan and Ohio, like this one where they're taxing pensions to pay for corporate tax cuts. http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/20...get_delive.html

More here: http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/03/1...T1&iref=BN1