Eminor3rd

Greg, the White Sox have been doing exactly what you're asking every year since 2005, it's failed 100% of the time, and you are constantly calling for everyone to be fired.

Right -- remember all those conversations we all had where we asked ourselves if the top two free agents in the class would be enough to make us a contender with Sale, Quintana, and Eaton as a core? Ok, now ask the same question except without Sale, Quintana, and Eaton.

Blowing $30-50mm on multi-year deals for Jake Arrieta and Mike Moustakas, just to win 71 games instead of 64, earning us a worse draft pick in the short term and tying up resources and roster spots on declining veterans during our competitive window instead of using those resources to get better players that fills important voids on the roster.

He's toxic.

Look, you can be anti-rebuild. I don't agree, but can respect that stance. You can hate the strategy or the execution or both. But there is NO argument to ABANDON it at this point. It's happening, it's underway, and we've begun paying the price. Why on earth would you want them to stop NOW? Do you realize how much worse it would be NOT to stay the course?

Again -- you're citing single occurrences as if they're trends or facts. You're essentially saying, "Epstein was smart enough to hire Maddon when he was available. Why won't Hahn hire Maddon?" Well, because Maddon isn't available. It's the same reason the Sox didn't draft Kris Bryant. When we look to past successes for inspiration or direction, we need to focus on strategic points that can be applied to today's situation, and avoid getting caught up on specific decisions that are irrelevant to today's game. Example: BAD LOGIC -- The Cubs ended up with a ton of great young positional prospects, but not enough pitchers. So they signed Jon Lester and won the World Series. Therefore, the White Sox should make sure they focus only on hitters and that they have enough money to sign a big free agent pitcher when they want to contend. GOOD LOGIC -- The Cubs focused on amassing high-upside talent, regardless of position, from every possible source -- draft, International signings, trades, waiver claims, post-hype reclamations projects, etc. Then, when enough of that talent arrived to make the team interesting, they used money to acquire veterans to fill in the gaps that were left. The White Sox should also do this.

That's an entirely different question.

It really isn't that helpful to cite single examples as if they are evidence of a trend. There are only three examples of completed "modern rebuilds" that we have to reference. There's no way you can look at any of them and say "the Sox have to do x with pitchers, y with position players, z with promotions, etc. because the Cubs/Astros/Royals did." There are too many moving pieces -- just do what's right by the players, for the roster, for the market, etc.

You explained everyone's concern about money with the first part of your post -- we don't care how rich Jerry Reinsdorf is, but at the end of the day (whether we like it or not), the payroll is only going to go so high. If there's only, say $150mm to spend, then we like to see it spent efficiently, so we can have the most good players.

As excited as everyone is about Liberatore, that's how excited everyone was about Hankins nary a month ago. High School pitchers just have too many reps/physical changes to undergo ahead of them to be popped in the top 5. It's an extreme risk in an already extremely risky game.

Right - a la the Pirates. Even though greg can't see it, the whole point in us being obsessed with saving Jerry's money is so that Jerry's money can be spent later, to greater and more precise effect. That doesn't mean we should spend solely for the sake of spending, but it DOES mean we should be considering our projected window of contention when we decide to pursue or not to pursue a particular free agent. And to your point, it DOES mean that it needs to BE spent. For me (and many of us), that makes Machado/Harper particularly interesting -- because their age means that buying talent a year or two ahead of schedule might actually be worth it, given that we can't expect the same level or talent to be available when the time is just right.

I agree with you on that -- the franchise player opt out has become something of a proven precedent. I was just responding to the "it doesn't hurt a team that much if you think about it" part, not because I think it's a dealbreaker or anything, but because it is a common misconception that fans seem to have -- to consider the range of outcomes from an ad hoc perspective, and thus misunderstand the economics. Just trying to clarify the cost.

No one wants this, no matter how many times you say it.

I don't think I've (personally) read anything that says India is a big league SS. I'm for BPA.

For me it's the Royals. Over the years, I've found my hate waxing and waning depending upon which of the others is good at the time (Indians in the 90's, Twins for most of the 2000's, Tigers for the John Danks era, etc.), but the Royals never go away. And how the players have comported themselves after their victory has only made it worse.

A deal can still end up an overall net positive if the player opts out (as in "this team has been better off signing this player than not having signed the player"), yes, but the same deal would be better if the opt out wasn't there. Even in the example of Belle: yes, it worked out better for the Sox in retrospect, because Belle declined suddenly and unexpectedly, but Reinsdorf and many others were extremely upset at the time that it happened, because Belle was worth more than the remainder of his contract -- which is why it made sense for him to opt out and find a better deal. If the opt-out wasn't there, the Sox could have also avoided a declining Belle by trading him at that time, and the return would have been a net positive that reflected the surplus value of the deal. This isn't to say that an opt-out should never be accepted in a deal, it's just that it is a player advantage and should come with a cost during negotiations. All of that "paying for the surplus value in early years" still applies to a deal with an opt out. The team is still on the hook for that money, should the player age as expected or worse than expected. All of the "upside" is lost, because if the player ages better than expected, and thus the team is in line to get more of that surplus value than what they paid for, the deal gets torn up. Essentially all of the risk normally associated with a long-term, big money deal is still on the team, but without the potential for reward. It's the fact that the decision is in the hands of the player, not the team, that makes the difference. If, at the time of the opt out, the balance of money/value for the remainder of the deal is off in either direction, the team is guaranteed to get the worse end of it.

Balta is right here -- the opt-out is NEVER a good thing for team at the time it is signed. There are situations where it could end up being a blessing, in retrospect, if a player declines sharply and unexpectedly, but make no mistake -- it is a leverage point in favor of the player. The simple way to look at it is this: the player will only opt out if his contract contains significant surplus value at the time of the opt-out. If that occurs, even if the team wants to employ a strategy where they use the best years of the contract and get rid of the player for the decline, the team would be better off trading the contract than having the player depart for nothing. The player only opts IN if the contract is underwater or a wash. If the player opts OUT, the team loses a valuable asset.

This

I think it could have done a lot of his development as a hitter, but I don't see a substantial difference in the process of learning SS at the AAA or MLB level. Yeah, the balls are hit harder and the runners are faster, so we're going to see him have to develop in a more physically demanding environment, but I can't see how it would actually be stunting him in any way. It's not like he's going to pick up bad habits or anything as a result, you know?

It's hard to make the case that an infielder's defensive development was ruined by an aggressive call-up.

I f***ing hate the Royals

I got extremely excited when his velo was up/arm slot down in the Spring. ST stats don't predict much if anything, but mechanical and procedural changes generally do. But if the velo is back down, and the fastball doesn't have more run, he's not even going to be a #3. This version of Giolito only has one weapon (the curveball), and he can't command or control it well enough to use it more than sparingly. Is it the cold? I don't know, but I hope so.

No one is going to complain about too much content

At this point, I agree. I want him to focus on getting better at hitting, not learning a new position. That said, I VERY much wanted them to move him to when they acquired him. I think it would have been the best move at the time, but that ship has sailed.

Two thoughts on your post: First: I think we have to stop and remind ourselves why we like "good and cheap." The answer is because the more "good and cheap" pieces we have, the more resources that are available to purchase additional talent. THis means we eventually have to USE those resources for the math to work out. These cheap pieces are critical for the foundation of a successful team, but if we fail to shift our sights at some point, then we fail to capitalize on the advantage that it afforded us in the first place. We could have very efficient production all around the field, but if those guys are all 1-3 win players, we still aren't going to win any games. Second: I think all of the scenarios you mentioned are realistic and possible, but I don't think any of them are MORE likely than the standard scenario: useful-but-mediocre players remain so, and Machado remains a star level player. Further, even if you do get a logjam, I don't think you've really got much of a problem at all. Because again, "good and cheap" players are valuable trade chips. It's also worth considering how much more valuable depth is in the current game than it used to be. For example, if it turns out that Anderson is a 4 win player, Machado is a 5 win player, and Sanchez is a 3 win player, you still may get a TON more value out of using Sanchez as a utility guy who can rest either player without a substantial loss in production, and who can step in a starter should either hit the disabled list. My point is, I don't think you ever really have to worry about having too many good players, because desired assets tend to be fungible. The only thing you have to worry about is if too many of those players end up BAD. In that scenario, with so many holes to plug, can you afford to put so many resources into filling just one? Now, if Anderson becomes a star in the next four months and Machado INSISTS on playing SS only, that changes the calculus. But we'll know about that before we get a chance to sign him.